Labor Law: Filing Requirements of Taft-Hartley Act—Federal Pre-Emption by Roberts, Donald N.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 6 Number 3 Article 13 
4-1-1957 
Labor Law: Filing Requirements of Taft-Hartley Act—Federal Pre-
Emption 
Donald N. Roberts 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Donald N. Roberts, Labor Law: Filing Requirements of Taft-Hartley Act—Federal Pre-Emption, 6 Buff. L. 
Rev. 335 (1957). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol6/iss3/13 
This Recent Decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ 
University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
RECENT DECISIONS
Labor Law: Filing Requirements of Taft-Hartley Act-Federal Pre-EMption
A local union refused to file with the Secretary of Labor any of the financial
or organizational data required by the National Labor Relations Act, 61 STAT.
146, 29 U. S. C. 9(f), (g) (1947), and, with the National Labor Relations
Board, any of the non-communist affidavits described in section 9(h) of that
Act. In an appeal by the union to set aside an injunction issued by a state court
prohibiting peaceful picketing, held (7-1): a union not in compliance with the
filing requirements of the Act, did not violate the Act by striking for recogni-
tion since Congress has not required such filing as a condition precedent to the
obligation of an employer to bargain collectively. The employer would be guilty
of an unfair -labor practice upon failure to bargain collectively with the empoy-
ees' chosen representatives. L. M. R. A. §8(a) (5). United Mine Workers v. Ar-
kansas Oak Flooring Co., 351 U. S. 62 (1956).
The Supreme Court reversal was not unexpected in that such an interpreta-
tion of the filing sections in the Act (§9f, g & h) has been recognized in the
federal circuits for several years. A non-complying union suffers only in that it is
prohibited recourse to the N. L. R. B. for a representation election or to file an
unfair labor practice complaint. N. L. R. B. v. Pecheur Lozenge Co., 209 F. 2d
393 (2d Cir. 1953); N. L. R. B. v. Tenn. Egg Co., 201 F. 2d 370 (6th Cir.
1953); West Tex. -Utilities Co. v. N. L. R. B., 184 F. 2d 233 (D. C. Cir. 1950);
N. L. R. B. v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 205 F. 2d 131 (1st Cir. 1953). These
same cases held that the union can, however, take other lawful action such as
a strike and may peacefully picket the premises.
It appears to be the gravamen of the decision that because of the basic
right to picket peacefully, inherited from the spirit of the Wagner Act and re-
iterated in Taft-Hartley (§7), federal pre-emption in this area of labor-manage-
ment relations must prevail. In fairness to the decision, this writer does not find
the state deprived of a concurrent right to require similar reports and affidavits
as those pronounced in section 9, L. M. R. A. However, the rationale appears
to be that a non-complying union may not be restrained from picketing by a
Federal Court under the Act, and therefore a state may not restrict peaceful
picketing under Taft-Hartley or by any state filing statute.
Federal pre-emption in labor relations has been a constant issue since the
inception of Congressional legislation affecting unionism. Although the states
have been severely restricted, they have not been precluded from acting in every
area involving interstate industrial and labor relations. A state may exercise its
police power to prevent breaches of the peace on picket lines. Allen-Bradley v.
W. E. R. B., 315 U. S. 740 (1942); United Auto Workers v. W. E. R. B., 351
U. S. 266 (1956). For an interesting discussion concerning federal pre-emption
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in relation to picketing, see Comment, Jurisdiction and Free Speech Problems in
Peaceful Picketing, 4 BUFFALO L. REv. 232 (1955). A state may also exercise
jurisdiction to decide civil damage suits based upon common law torts, although
the tortious conduct constituted an unfair labor practice under the Act. United
Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U. S. 656 (1954). In conjunc-
tion with this principle, it is recognized that a state court may hear damage suits
instituted under section 303 (a) of the Act respecting secondary boycotts and
unlawful combinations. See Brody, Federal Pre-emption Comes of Age in Labor
Relations, 5 LAB. L. J. 743 (1954). Injurious conduct which the N. L. R. B. is
without power to prevent can be a permissive area wherein the state may act.
Thus, it was held that a state may enjoin the union from calling numerous and
irregular union meetings during working hours which materially interfered with
production. United Auto Workers v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 245 (1949). It has
also been held that where a state has acted in respect to a separable segment of
matter not covered by nor in conflict with the expressed or implied powers re-
served under the federal statute, it may validly exercise jurisdiction. For example,
in Algoma Plywood Co. v. W. E. R. B., 336 U. S. 301 (1949), a clause in the
labor agreement was held invalid because a Wisconsin statute forbade enforce-
ment of a maintenance-of-membership clause unless the contract containing it
was approved by two-thirds of the employees in a referendum conducted by the
state labor board.
However, the scope of state jurisdiction is, in reality, a narrow one. Exclu-
sive federal authority over interstate industrial and labor relations has become an
emphatic doctrine embraced by the Supreme Court. Where the pre-emptive issue
arises, it was held that the state must defer jurisdiction to the N. L. R. B. whose
duty it is to interpret Taft-Hartley. Weber v. Anheuser-Bush Inc., 348 U. S. 468
(1955); See LaCrosse Tel. Corp. v. W. . R. B., 336 U. S. 18 (1949).
It is evident that if a state's action conflicts with the Federal Act, the Board
will deny the state's authority-such as where provisions of a state statute impinge
upon the employees' federal right to select their union. Hill v. Florida ex. rel
Watson, 325 U. S. 538 (1944). It has been further held that the exercise of con-
current powers by the state, as distinguished from conflicting action, must gen-
erally fall for the reason that there can be no reason for duplication between
state and federal boards. In Upited Automobile Workers v. O'Brien, 339 U. S.
454 (1949) the state was not permitted concurrent regulation of peaceful strikes
for higher wages. The power of certification by a state labor board was held invalid
in Bethlehem v. N. Y. S. N.L. R. B., 330 U. S. 767 (1947). Another landmark de-
cision disallowed a state's duplicate regulation of unfair labor practices. Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U. S. 485 (1953); Accord, Plankington Packing Co. v.
W. E. R. B., 338 U. S. 953 (1950).
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Some states have assumed jurisdiction where the N. L. R. B. refused it due
to self-imposed limitations. See 16 U. PiTT. RYv. 376 (1955); 34 L. R. R. M.
75 (1954).And in New York, some proponents of state regulations cling to an
early decision, Davega City Radio v. N. Y. S. L. R. B., 281 N. Y. 13, 22 N. E. 2d
145 (1939), holding that the state board may act until ousted by the N. L. PL B.'s
exercise of its jurisdiction. See also Natelson Bros. -v. N. Y. S. L. R. B., 194 Misc.
635, 88 N. Y. S. 2d 129 (Sup. Ct. 1949). However, as the Supreme Court and
N. L. R. B. declare greater breadth to federal pre-emptive powers under Taft-
Hartley, these state policies are reduced to innocuous obscurity. The Oak Flooring
Case extends the implied federal pre-emptive doctrine to protect a non-complying
union's coercive and economic practices that are designed to force managements
compliance with lawful union demands viz-peaceful picketing.
It is to be noted that the consequences of non-compliance may, in some in-
stances, have a serious and detrimental effect upon a union seeking representa-
tion. Providing an election bar does not exist, an employer or rival union may
request an N. L. R. B. certification wherein the non-complying union will not be
allowed a place on the ballot. See. U. M. W. v. N. L. R. B., 38 L. R. R. M. 2711,
2713 (1956).
As to the judicial attitude afforded pre-emptive rights under Taft-Hartley,
one finds an obvious substantiation of federal direction and control over labor
relations. In the 84th Congress, a bill was introduced in the Senate that would
have prevented federal laws, such as the Taft-Hartley Act, from taking precedence
over consistent state laws dealing with the same subject except where specifically
provided. See 38 L. R. R M. 122 (1956). The bill failed to receive appreciable
support from the legislators. Until such time as Congress should specify other-
wise the federal pre-emptive powers will remain broadly construed.
Donald N. Roberts
Workmen's Compensation--Lanch-Time Injuries On Employer's Premises
Plaintiff, an employee of defendant company, having commenced her lunch
hour, proceeded to a company-sponsored cafeteria located on defendant's property
a short distance from the building where plaintiff worked. As she walked across
defendant's driveway, she slipped on the ice, sustaining an injury for which the
Michigan Workmen's Compensation Department awarded compensation. Held
(5-3): award set aside on the grounds that the injury did not arise out of and
in the course of the employment as plaintiff was not actively engaged in the
